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This article briefly reviews the US case law dealing with the issue of birth 
control fraud and speculates on the possibility of a similar action succeeding 
in the UK. It then focuses on media reporting of one such case. A common 
media reading of this case, and one which can also be detected in some 
academic commentary of similar cases, is to contextualise it as part of an 
ongoing 'battle of the sexes' where historic poles of inequality have become 
reversed and women have gained unfair (legal) advantage in procreative 
matters. It is argued that such an understanding is flawed and misleading, 
serving to distract attention from the legal structuring of these kinds of 
disputes. The article concludes that the operation of the law can here be 
better understood as seeking to support the nuclear family in a way which 
can impact negatively on both individual men and individual women. The 
birth control fraud cases invite us to rethink the way that parental 
obligations are imposed and to justify more rigorously the choices which we 
make in this regard. 





'Women buy men's sperm but leave men out. A man's increasingly traceable 
sperm is used to bind him to economic relations he would not have chosen and 
often cannot sustain. Now, like a woman, a man can be made materially 
accountable for, yet socially alienated from, his sexual activities; he may therefore 
feel that, like a woman (though surely less painfully) he is a victim of his 
procreative body.'1  
 
Let me start with a story. A young woman called Kellie Rae Smith gets a job in an 
estate agency. Her boss, Peter Wallis, turns out to be a like minded person. They 
get on well and eventually realise that there is a mutual attraction between them. 
They date, begin a relationship, and, after some time, decide to move in together. 
Although they had agreed that they would not have children, Kellie becomes 
pregnant. Peter asks her to have an abortion. 
 When she refuses, he asks her to marry him. Again, she declines, claiming 
that he doesn't love her (if he does, why is he only asking her to marry him now 
that she is pregnant?). Their relationship degenerates. He accuses her of lying to 
him about her contraceptive use. She maintains that she was just unlucky; 
contraceptive failure is a part of life. Things go down hill still further and they go to 
court. He accuses her of 'intentionally acquiring and misusing his semen'. She 
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retorts that his ejaculate was a gift and that he 'surrendered any right of 
possession to his semen when he transferred it during voluntary intercourse'. The 
imagination of the popular press is caught and the drama is played out in the 
world's media even before it reaches the courts.2 As this language suggests, in the 
case of Wallis v Smith, Peter Wallis is threatening to sue Kellie Smith inter alia for 
the conversion of his sperm.3 His action is only the latest in a long line of similar 
cases which allege what is known as birth control fraud. The only novelty of this 
case lies in the fact that conversion is alleged in addition to the more usual actions 
in breach of contract, deceit or trespass to the person.  
Take a second, somewhat more unusual, case.4 SF attends a party at TM's house. 
SF has been drinking for several hours before arriving at the party and, when they 
get there, his brother has to put him to bed (fully clothed). When SF wakes up the 
following morning, he is wearing only his unbuttoned shirt and TM is standing in 
the doorway, towelling herself dry. TM later claims to have had sex with SF while 
he was passed out and jokes that it has 'saved her a trip to the sperm bank'. That 
she made these remarks was witnessed by three people, and expert evidence 
testifies to the medical possibility of ejaculation in these circumstances. TM does 
not dispute SF's account but merely seeks to have certain additional evidence - 
notably the fact that she had attended the party dressed as a condom, and that 
intercourse had occurred three times during the night - struck out as irrelevant to 
the proceedings. In the states of New Mexico and Alabama where these stories 
unfolded, if an unmarried woman becomes pregnant as a result of sexual 
intercourse, legal paternity is established on the basis of genetic fatherhood and 
entails an automatic liability to share in the costs of raising the child.5 Actions have 
also been brought in a number of other states and there is no reason to dismiss 
out of hand the possibility that a similar claim could be made on this side of the 
Atlantic or, indeed, in any other country which imposes financial responsibility for 
child support on the basis of genetic parentage.6 Consequently, these cases 
should in themselves be of interest to lawyers working in other jurisdictions. 
However, these cases are also significant for another reason which will form a 
major focus of this paper. It is my contention that the media reaction provoked by 
Wallis v Smith reveals fascinating insights into contemporary cultural 
understandings of gender relations concerning, in particular, men's role in 
reproduction. Finally, I want also to argue that these cases are useful in providing a 
prompt to rethink what legal weight should be accorded to the biological fact of 
genetic parenthood. In the first part of this paper, I will outline the US case law and 
briefly discuss the possibilities of an action in birth control fraud succeeding on this 
side of the Atlantic. In a second section, I will scrutinise newspaper reports of this 
case. I will argue that the media's unproblematic location of it within an ongoing 
'battle of the sexes', where women seem to be gaining the upper hand, provides a 
dangerous and erroneous understanding of what is at stake here. In a third 
section, I attempt a brief and inevitably partial review of why liability for child 
support came to be based primarily on a genetic link. I conclude with some general 
thoughts on the biological basis for establishing legal fatherhood and paternal 
rights and obligations and some specific suggestions as to what thinking about the 
birth control fraud cases might contribute to our understanding.7 
 
Before moving on, I should make one brief point of clarification. The rights and 
obligations attached to legal fatherhood are governed by a number of disparate 
legal provisions.8 Here my focus is exclusively on genetic fathers who are not 
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married to the mother of the child in question. Such a man will automatically be 
liable to make financial provision for the child under the Child Support Act 1991 
and, where the mother is in receipt of social security benefits, he may be pursued 
for such money regardless of her wishes.9 However he will not have parental 
responsibility (and decision making power with regard to the child) unless he 
makes an agreement with the mother in the prescribed form or obtains a court 
order to such effect pursuant to s 4 of the Children Act 1989.10 Neither does he 




In a series of cases argued before the US courts, men and women have sued their 
(former) sexual partners on the basis of alleged misrepresentation regarding the 
latter's professed sterility or use of some form of birth control.11 In these cases, it is 
claimed that reliance on a partner's representations has resulted in a pregnancy 
which was unwanted by the plaintiff and which has caused her/him harm. In the 
majority of the cases, the injury alleged is that a male plaintiff now finds himself 
liable for some eighteen years of child support payments. In their attempts to 
recover this money, men have sued in breach of contract, fraud, trespass to the 
person and, most recently, conversion.12 The US courts have responded with a 
considerable degree of coherence, rejecting all the actions brought by men and at 
least one similar claim for damages brought by a woman.13 They have, however, 
allowed recovery for actual, physical injuries sustained as the result of an abnormal 
pregnancy14 or for the cost of an abortion.15  
In rejecting these actions, the courts have relied on three broad grounds. First they 
have held that where the damages sought represent liability for child support 
payments for a healthy child, that this is an attempt to avoid statutorily imposed 
obligations. Thus, to allow the claim would be to subvert the intention of the 
legislature regarding how such obligations should be apportioned, and to go 
against its professed aim of protecting the welfare of the child. The fact that the 
father seeks damages from the mother rather than to avoid the payments per se, 
cannot disguise an intention to evade those obligations. Secondly, the courts have 
expressed concerns about privacy, arguing that to police such intimate matters as 
birth control agreements between consenting adult sexual partners would be an 
unwarranted and unjustifiable intrusion. Thirdly, the courts have exhibited 
considerable hostility towards the idea of leaving the taxpayer financially liable to 
support illegitimate children. What of the outcome in the two cases outlined above? 
In S F v T M, SF's action failed. The court emphasised that any wrongful conduct 
on the part of the mother should not alter the genetic father's duty to provide 
support for his child, and noted that SF's appropriate response was to file for 
criminal sanctions to be brought against TM. One dissenting judgement disagreed 
only to the extent of reasoning that the father should be liable merely in so far as 
the mother is unable to support the child on her own earnings ability.16 Other cases 
have similarly refused to allow the genetic father to escape liability for child support 
when he was a minor at the time of intercourse, and hence where the mother had 
been guilty of statutory rape17 or where the father had learning disabilities and was 
argued to be incapable of consenting to father a child.18 In both these cases, as in 
S F, the court reasoned that the man's appropriate response is to petition for 
criminal sanctions to be brought against the mother. His obligation to support the 
child is unaltered. 
Kent Academic Repository – http://kar.kent.ac.uk    Kent Law School 
Published version available in Legal Studies, 21 (3). pp. 460-480 
- 4 - 
 
 
At the time of writing, there has been no reported decision in Wallis v Smith. 
Although there is no reported birth control fraud case in New Mexico to stand as 
precedent, given the huge weight of authority against Wallis in other states, it 
seems inconceivable that he will succeed even if he is able to prove his version of 
the facts (which, in itself, is likely to be difficult). The only part of his action which 
seemed novel - the claim in conversion – has recently failed in a parallel case 
brought in Tennessee.19 
 
AN ACTION FOR BIRTH CONTROL FRAUD IN ENGLISH LAW? 
 
Would a plaintiff in the position of SF or Wallis be more likely to succeed in the 
English courts? The only directly relevant reported UK authority is the Scottish 
case of Bell v McCurdle.20 Here, the question arose of whether a man could avoid 
providing financial support for a child born after his partner had failed to use the 
contraceptive pills which were in her possession. The sheriff held that these facts 
allowed room for an argument along similar lines to contributory negligence and 
volenti (the mother had voluntarily assumed the risk of falling pregnant). Thus, he 
held, the genetic father should be liable only to make nominal child support 
payments. Overturning this ruling in a judgement strongly critical of the sheriff's 
reasoning, the Court of Second Division held that it was not within the power of the 
courts to limit the father's financial obligations because of imprudence on the part 
of the mother. In Bell v McCurdle, there was no allegation that the woman had 
deliberately misled the man as to her (lack of) contraceptive use. Further, at least 
part of the Court of Second Division's reasoning would suggest scope for 
distinguishing this case from one of deliberate fraud. In particular, the Court notes 
that: 'there is a duty on the man to take contraceptive precautions, or to take 
reasonable care to ensure that his partner does so. If he does not do so, he may 
literally have to pay for the consequences'21 
We are left to speculate, therefore, as to how far the Court would be prepared to 
distinguish the situation where the man could establish that he had taken 
reasonable care with regard to contraception22 or, indeed, that he was unconscious 
during sexual intercourse and thus in no position to take steps to avoid conception 
taking place. No relevant precedent exists south of the border, but it is clear that 
the various actions which have failed in the US would also face difficulties in the 
English courts. The action for breach of contract would seem to be precluded by 
the principle of English law that a contract will only be formed where the parties 
have displayed an intention to create legal relations. As such the courts are 
unlikely to be convinced by the claim that the agreement of the parties to have 
sexual relations is a contract capable of containing a declaration, similar to a 
condition in a contract, regarding the use of contraceptives (or other facts that 
negate, or minimize the risk of pregnancy).23 The action for conversion would face 
all the problems of proving sperm to be property,24 and of establishing that Smith 
had performed a positive act in the taking of it: conversion has never lain where the 
defendant once had the plaintiff's goods but was unable to return them because 
they had been lost or negligently destroyed.25 The actions which look technically 
most plausible are assault and deceit. At the heart of the action in assault is the 
idea that a false declaration can negate consent. In the US whilst the various 
actions which have been brought by men on this ground have failed, a successful 
action has been brought by a woman against her attorney with whom she 
consented to have sex in reliance on his declaration that he was not capable of 
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having children.26 It was held that she had only consented to the intercourse on the 
basis of this assurance, and hence her consent was vitiated: there had been no 
consent to the act of impregnation. However, it could be difficult for men in the 
position of Wallis to make this argument as all that needs be shown is consent to 
the general nature of the contact. Wallis would have to show that consenting to 
non-procreative sex is of a different general nature than consenting to procreative 
sex or, more accurately, that consenting to sex entailing a very small risk of 
conception is of a different nature from consenting to sex with a much larger risk of 
conception.27 A plaintiff in the position of SF, on the other hand, has given no 
consent to intercourse and has a clearer action in assault. However, his problem 
would be to establish that the damages awarded should cover his child support 
payments, and I will consider this below. 
 
The most appropriate action for a plaintiff in the position of Wallis would seem to lie 
in the action for deceit. A will be liable in tort to B if knowingly or recklessly, A 
makes a statement to B with intent that it shall be acted upon by B, who does act 
upon it and thereby suffers damage.28 If the plaintiff does rely on the statement, it is 
no defence that he acted incautiously and failed to take reasonable steps to verify 
its truth. In principle, the plaintiff is entitled, so far as money can do it, to be put into 
the position in which he would have been had the fraudulent statement not been 
made. Can this include the claiming back from the mother of sums equivalent to 
child support payments? Here is the crucial issue. Although the English legal 
context is different from that of the US, it seems likely that similar policy 
considerations would pertain. A desire to protect the privacy of consenting adult 
sexual partners has long been a guiding principle of family law29 and receives new 
weight with the full introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. Secondly, whilst the 
welfare of the child is not paramount under the Child Support Act 1991, it does 
remain a consideration.30 Thirdly, whilst the welfare state context is rather different 
in England and Wales, the hostility towards the notion that it should be taxpayers 
who support illegitimate children is rather familiar.31 Further, following a recent 
House of Lords decision in Macfarlane & Anor v Tayside Health Board (1999), it 
seems clear that the will be reluctant to award damages which suggest that the life 
of a healthy child is a compensatable harm.32 It seems likely, therefore, that an 
English or Welsh SF or Wallis would find himself unable to escape a share of the 
financial liability for his genetic offspring. This remains true even when conception 
results from sexual assault, and even where a woman has deliberately misled a 
man with regard to her contraceptive usage. Whilst there is surprisingly little written 
on this issue, at least two commentators have argued that the courts have struck 
the wrong balance in such cases, treating the male plaintiffs unfairly. Both 
Shifman33 and Terrell Mann34 contend that public policy considerations of the 
welfare of the child dictate that where fraud is established, men should be liable for 
child support only to the extent in which the mother is incapable of providing for the 
child herself. In other words, the father's claim in tort should be allowed in so far as 
it cannot be demonstrated that the child will be adversely affected by a finding in 
the father's favour.35 The idea that the law is favouring women's reproductive rights 
at the expense of those of men draws on concerns which have been expressed by 
both lawyers and non-lawyers in other contexts. For example, having engaged in a 
more general review of the position of the father in comparative European legal 
perspective, one commentator has gone so far as to claim that the poles of gender 
inequality have now been reversed, with women gaining the upper hand to the 
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detriment of all: ’western women now have complete control over whether a man is 
to be a father and whether a child is to live or die. This change is all the more 
striking since men themselves have provided them with the opportunity and the 
right to break out of the magic circle of maternity in which she was imprisoned. But 
where does this lead, now that men in turn are under a pressure to care for their 
children? ... In the history of the relations between the sexes, inequality has been 
the rule for too long, and this inequality has engendered violence and vengeance. 
It is impossible to defeat this violence and restore peace simply by reversing the 
poles of inequality and retaliation.'36 I want now to move on to consider some 
broader understandings of what is at stake in these cases. This will lead me first to 
use the newspaper reporting of Wallis v Smith to highlight some general ideas 
regarding contemporary understandings of men's role in reproduction. As will be 
seen, such reports resonate with the concerns expressed here by Meulders-Klein: 
things have gone too far and women are seen to be winning the battle of the 
sexes. I will then go on to attempt to locate the legislative provisions governing 
men's financial liability for their genetic offspring within a broader socio-political 
context. I will argue that similar ideas were at work here and were similarly 
unhelpful.  
 
'SPERM BANDITS', SMITH V WALLIS AND REVERSING THE POLES OF 
INEQUALITY 
 
'One of the worst fears of the male sex is being tricked into pregnancy. Both men 
and women desire sex, but women hold most of the cards. Condoms are fine for 
preventing disease, but, call it a failure of medical research or a failure of resolve, 
no current form of birth control is as reliable as those that are available only to 
women. So a man and woman sleep together. She assures him that she's using 
something. He believes her. And she gets pregnant. Once she's with child he can't 
legally force her to have the baby, and he can't force her to abort it. Since all the 
action from here on out takes place in her body, she gets to call the shots. That's 
the way it should be, since it's women not men, who suffer through morning 
sickness, swollen ankles, months of waddling about without being able to see their 
feet and the pain of childbirth. Women have a stake in pregnancy that men can't 
claim. But before pregnancy, they have an equal responsibility for what 
happens...Women frequently complain about men who avoid their responsibilities. 
But women have responsibilities as well ... A woman shouldn't be allowed to lie 
about something as crucial as birth control and then hold up the father for a lifetime 
of child support.'37 
The press reporting of Wallis v Smith on both sides of the Atlantic was remarkable 
in the uniformity of the way in which it chose to frame the central issue of the 
case.38 It was presented within a context of ongoing 'long simmering gender wars'39 
where, in the terms used by Meulders-Klein, poles of inequality are reversed with 
women gaining the upper hand.40 Such accounts fit neatly within existing influential 
cultural narratives where men's role in reproduction is seen as increasingly 
marginalised and women are unfairly advantaged. The tone adopted by two 
journalists (writing respectively for an American and a British newspaper) is typical: 
'Wallis' complaint touches upon ancient fears and frustrations. For centuries, it was 
believed that witches stole sperm from men as they slept and made them impotent 
or even sterile. Wallis, it would seem, has given that mystic tale an updated twist. 
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And some men's groups think he has a point. When it comes to procreation, they 
complain, women hold all the power'.41 
 
'Whereas comeback for undiscussed pregnancy used to be that hapless men were 
tricked into parenthood, now the objection centres around loss of control. First 
women stole men's jobs, then their earning power, now their body fluid'.42 
 
For both of these journalists, it seems, this is not an isolated and unusual case 
involving no more than the individual litigants concerned: rather it is a part of 
broader picture of male powerlessness. Moreover, its significance is not limited to 
reproductive matters, but is part of an identifiable and continuing trend whereby 
men have been pushed out of the labour market and undermined in the family. 
Such trends fit into broader cultural stories told in a flood of popular books such as 
Susan Faludi's recent bestseller Stiffed: the Betrayal of the Modern Man43 and, on 
this side of the Atlantic, Melanie Phillips' The Sex-Change Society: Feminised 
Britain and the Neutered Male.44 In contrary stance, Germaine Greer's most recent 
book sets out precisely to take on claims made even by feminists that 'feminism 
had gone too far'.45 Developing the theme of male disempowerment and 
marginalisation, another British journalist entitles her discussion of Wallis, 'Sperm 
Bandits', thus implying an organised community of women who deliberately set out 
to steal semen.46 Litvinoff's report is accompanied by an image of a distraught man 
clutching his head in anguish and exclaiming, 'And I thought it was love that she 
wanted'. The cartoon ironically reverses expectations: here we have not the 
familiar cultural figure of a woman seeking love who has been used for sex. Rather 
we are presented with a man who wanted love being used for his sperm then cast 
aside with callous indifference. The author locates her discussion of Wallis within 
the framework of the spectacular turning of the tables implied by this image. Where 
once men held all the power, it is now women who can decide when to become 
pregnant regardless of whether the man wants a child or whether he will be around 
later to help to raise it. It seems that now women want to be left holding the baby, 
whilst men are expected merely to hold their chequebooks at the ready. Men 
become the 'disposable sex', useful only for economic purposes.47 In discussing  
Wallis, Litvinoff makes reference to her own female friends who have similarly 
become pregnant against the wishes or without the knowledge of their sexual 
partners: 'A few [of these women] have been married to avowed non-procreators, 
but most have been in less stable relationships, or not in one at all, and have felt 
the pressure of the biological deadline. "I might just let myself get pregnant", they 
say. Sometimes it's because they want to tie a man more securely to them, usually 
it's because they want a baby. It doesn't matter what happens afterwards. They've 
got enough pent-up love for two.'48 Thus, we are told, women are seeking sperm 
with no concern for the men who provide it. More than one journalist mentions 
those women who have famously selected men as a store of good genetic material 
rather than as potential social fathers. Madonna chooses a fine physical specimen 
(her personal trainer) to father her first child, Jodie Foster leafs through the records 
of a sperm bank in order to uncover the right combination of brains, health and 
stamina for hers.49 Sperm is routinely, but wrongly, treated as a commodity, 
divorced from the man who has produced it:  
 
'It even makes us ponder whether women have a right to "use" sperm in ways in 
which men never intended it to be used and whether in our high-tech society 
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sperm is becoming just another commodity to be used, stolen, banked or donated 
like so much grain or oil'.50 
 
'As modern medicine has placed the male seed in the language of the market – 
sperm 'bank' and 'donor' - it is little wonder men are arguing that semen is property 
and women that ejaculation is a freebie'.51 
 
'[M]odern fertility medicine has turned the male seed into a recognised 
commodity... Where will it end? Will spent men ring from the bedside, complaining: 
"I wish to report a theft?" Might semen be listed on the futures market alongside 
pork bellies?'52  
As such, Wallis v Smith is compellingly located within broader concerns about 
men's procreative powerlessness. The reproductive oppression of women seems 
to have been replaced by that of men. In a particularly striking reversal of feminist 
rhetoric, several of the journalists commenting on Wallis v Smith go so far as to call 
for a male controlled contraceptive which will allow men to take control of their 
procreative capacities: 'At the least, this case cries out for more research on male 
contraception methods. The only mainstream method we now have is the condom, 
which is very far from foolproof in preventing either pregnancy or sexually 
transmitted diseases .... If men had a safe, effective birth control pill, the incidence 
of unwed fatherhood (and motherhood) would go way down.'53 
If I have dwelled on the newspaper coverage of Smith v Wallis at some length, this 
is partly because such a close reading seems to be to be useful in capturing an 
intuitive anxiety which we might feel in reading the birth control fraud cases. 
Drawing on the same 'battle of the sexes' model detectable in the academic work 
of Meulders-Klein which I cited above, the media reporting provides a most 
tempting way of understanding what is at stake. This reading is no doubt 
exacerbated by the way in which the adversarial structure of tort law constructs 
such disputes: in the courtroom we have a man alleging a particular harm done to 
him by a woman, and we have a woman arguing for the needs of her child. In this 
framework, it might appear that men fare rather badly. In case after case, the 
man's action is dismissed and he is held liable to maintain the child living with its 
mother, even though he had no say in whether this child was to be born. In at least 
some of these cases, moreover, it seems undeniable that the defendant had acted 
extremely badly; on occasion criminally. From there it is an easy and, for some, a 
tempting step to locate these cases within existing cultural narratives which assert 
that feminism has gone too far, poles of inequality have been reversed and that 
women have now gained an unfair advantage. 
Yet to generalise sympathy for the male plaintiffs in these cases within a broader 
framework of an ongoing 'battle of the sexes' is unhelpful. Crucially, what is 
concealed in this process is some scrutiny of the legal structuring of this dispute. 
Here, I do not intend just Wallis' attempt to translate the moral wrong which he 
believes he has suffered into the language of tort, but rather the fact that both 
actors are constrained by a law which attributes financial responsibility for children 
on the basis of genetic parentage. It is the underlying geneticised basis for support 
obligations which seems to lie at the heart of the problem. Accordingly, I would 
now like to push the discussion back a stage, in order to revisit the issue of why 
financial liability for children born outside of marriage is attributed primarily on this 
basis. It is my contention that the birth control fraud cases described above provide 
a useful prompt to rethink this principle. At this point, it will be helpful to review the 
historical development of the relevant laws in order to explore why the British and 
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US legislatures made this choice. As this historical development has already been 
extensively analysed by others, my own discussion will be very brief. 
 
'FECKLESS FATHERS' AND 'DEADBEAT DADS': THE CONTEXT OF REFORM 
IN THE 1980S 
 
'Not only is it just that fathers should contribute to the upkeep of their children: it is 
also crucial that we begin to break the culture which views it as acceptable for a 
man to walk away from the consequences of his actions in this way. Ensuring that 
fathers help support the mothers of their children is one way of doing that'.54 
As has been well documented by a number of writers in both Britain and the USA, 
the prioritisation of a genetic basis for legal fatherhood is of relevantly recent 
origin.55 Historically the primary consideration was the legal contract of marriage 
(between husband and wife) and not the biological relationship (between genetic 
father and child). The latter was presumed to follow the former, regardless of the 
realities of conception.56 In the 1970s, with a growth in divorce rates, the creation 
of large numbers of step-families and an increase in cohabitation outside of 
marriage, other methods of ensuring that men assumed responsibility for their 
dependent children were deemed necessary.57 One such idea, the concept of 'child 
of the family', made men responsible for the support of children whom they had 
treated as members of their families. Whilst this served some purpose in regulating 
obligations of an ever growing number of step-fathers, there were other families 
where no man had ever assumed a parenting role and where another solution was 
therefore necessary. Does it make sense to understand the perceived need for 
reform within the context of a battle of the sexes? The use of such imagery was 
certainly rife within the political debates in the 1980s and early 1990s which heard 
frequent expressions of concern that men were evading their responsibilities to 
women.58 Such men were constructed as 'feckless fathers' (or, in the USA, 
'deadbeat dads') who would desert their child(ren), leaving their ex-partners to  
cope in conditions of considerable hardship.59 In reforming the law, legislators 
claimed they would punish male immorality, whilst also congratulating themselves 
that something would be done for women and children.60 In the UK, such 
sentiments ultimately gave rise to the much derided Child Support Act 1991, a 
piece of legislation based on the principle that genetic parentage involves an 
absolute and unreserved responsibility to provide financial support for one's 
children.61 To what extent was this legislation a victory for women? In some 
quarters, it was certainly represented as such, with men's groups such as Families 
Need Fathers criticising it as a result of feminism gone too far.62 However, as 
numerous commentators have pointed out, the legislation seems to benefit the 
taxpayer more clearly than it does the single mother.63 Evidence given by the 
Government indicated that of £530 million social security savings expected to be 
achieved by the Child Support Agency in its first year of operation, only some £50 
million would find its way into pockets of parents with care.64 One study of the 
operation of the activities of the Child Support Agency, found that not one of the 53 
lone mothers interviewed had experienced a net gain in income following the 
Agency's intervention.65 Further, the rather punitive tone of the debates may have 
displaced awareness of the reality of the limited resources available to be 
recouped from many 'absent fathers'. As Krause notes with regard to the USA, the 
administrative costs of collecting support payments from fathers with low incomes  
an sometimes exceed the amount of money recovered.66 Garnham and Knights 
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cite the Child Support Agency's attempts to recover through the courts the arrears 
owed by one errant father who had been ordered to pay £6 per week despite the 
fact that he was unemployed.67 If the 1991 Act was not primarily concerned with 
helping women and children, then does it make sense to see it as about nothing 
more than cost cutting? Clearly not: whilst financial savings were important, the Act 
was surely also influenced by a moral agenda. Yet the normative vision of the 
reforms might be more accurately described as aiming to support the nuclear 
family than to increase provision for women and children. In an extensive body of 
work which predates the introduction of the 1991 Act, Carol Smart has analysed 
how family law operates to link genetic fathers to children where it is the genetic 
father who is most likely to reproduce some semblance of a nuclear family. She 
argues that where the genetic father is not available, or is unsuitable, then the 
social father will suffice. Where there is a genetic father and a social (step)father 
(as in the course of divorce and remarriage) the law will seek to preserve the rights 
of the genetic father in the 'best interests of the children'. In other cases where  
there is both a genetic and a social father (as with infertility treatment services 
involving donor sperm) the tendency is to ignore the genetic father and to invest all 
the rights of legal fatherhood in the social father who will be the head of a two-
parent family.68  
 
Whilst the desire to tie fathers to their genetic offspring cannot be entirely reduced 
to a desire to protect the nuclear family,69 there is much to be learned by applying 
Smart's analysis to the 1991 legislation. It was clearly hoped that enforcing the 
obligation to pay maintenance might persuade fathers to retain their marital and 
paternal duties and also to make them less inclined to conceive children outside of 
marriage.70 Further, against the idea that the reforms were aimed to help deserted 
women, it can be noted that single and unmarried mothers were increasingly under 
attack from the very same politicians who were criticising 'absent fathers'. Locating 
the child support provisions in the context of a desire to bolster the nuclear family 
also brings into relief the extent to which the law operates to the disadvantage of 
individual women as well as men in this context. Imagine the following case: a 
male friend provides sperm to a lesbian couple who use it to inseminate one 
partner. The three discuss at length his gift and sign a document stating that the 
man should have neither rights nor obligations towards the eventual child. Whilst 
the lesbian partners can both be granted parental responsibility under s.4 of the 
Children Act 1989, this man remains the child's legal father and, unless the child is 
given up for adoption, nothing he can do will divest him of that status. If the couple 
want to claim social security benefits, the man will find himself pursued by the 
Child Support Agency for his share of the costs of the child's upbringing. If she 
attempts to withhold his name, the mother may find her benefits reduced. 
Experience suggests that where a genetic father chooses to go to court, he is 
unlikely to be denied a Parental Responsibility Order71 and further problems may 
arise if he attempts to assert contact rights. Likewise, in the US, it has been held 
that a signed affidavit relinquishing all parental rights cannot be binding on a 
man.72 
 
Further, as has been well documented by feminist writers, the genetic vision of 
paternity pushes women into a state of financial dependence on individual men 
with whom they may no longer want any contact.73 To return to Wallis v Smith: 
Kellie Smith says that she would prefer not to receive child support from Peter 
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Wallis, but realises that because she has filed for sole custody, the state will 
probably force him to pay.74 She may thus find herself forced back into a position of 
economic dependence on a man with whom, one might safely assume, she is no 
longer on the best of terms. And whilst liability for child support, the attribution of 
parental responsibility, residence and contact arrangements are all legally separate 
issues, it would be naive in the extreme to think that they are unrelated. A 
requirement that men financially support their offspring will inevitably lend moral 
weight to their claims to have greater rights to contact with them.75 To be clear: my 
point here is not that men should have either greater or lesser rights in relation to 
their children, my claim is simply that a genetic link per se is not the best way of 
deciding complex parental claims.76 One particularly ominous note is sounded by a 
US court's decision that the father who had committed the felony of statutory rape 
in the third degree did not forfeit his right to establish paternity.77 Here the Court 
held that the plaintiff was not merely looking to benefit from his wrongdoing, but 
desired to assume the responsibility of supporting his child. Whilst the courts may 
feel it appropriate to allow the plaintiff to redeem himself or live up to his 
responsibilities in this way, the woman who is forced to take his money (and a 
proportionate cut in any welfare benefits) may view things rather differently.78 The 
woman who has conceived during non-statutory rape is equally likely to find herself 
in this position. What would the English courts decide in such a case? Under s 6(2) 
of the Child Support Act 1991, the woman will not be financially penalised if she 
can convince the Child Support Agency that authorising the collection of money 
from him would cause her or her child a risk of harm or undue distress, but this 
may not be straightforward.79 Conception resulting from rape may seem to be a 
clear and uncontroversial example of such a case, however proving that 
conception results from rape will not always be easy. In most cases, the woman 
will not have a court judgeme nt to supporther claim: research suggests that the 
majority of rapes are not reported, the majority of those which are reported are not 





'[N]o child should come into the world without a man - and only one man - who can 
ensure that the child has a sociological father; that is to say, a guardian and a 
protector, a male link between the child and the rest of the community'.81 
'If the traditional social structure - the traditional, ongoing two-parent family - no 
longer exists, can its ghost support traditional financial responsibility?'82 
I began this paper with a brief discussion of two cases of so-called 'birth control 
fraud'. If we accept for the sake of argument that in these cases the men's stories 
are to be believed, it seems that both have been badly mistreated and yet are left 
without any means of recouping the substantial financial burden imposed on them 
by the duplicity of their sexual partners. Nonetheless, I have argued that a location 
of these cases within what I called the 'battle of the sexes' model (as accepted in 
the newspaper reporting and alluded to in some academic discussion) results in a 
misleading understanding of what is at stake here. I then went on to use these 
cases as a basis for discussing the genetic basis for legal paternity in broader 
terms, considering it within the context of political discourses targeting 'feckless 
fathers' and supporting the need for rules designed to protect the nuclear family 
and to punish 'irresponsible', recreational sex. 
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There is no reason to believe either that the political currency of supporting the 
nuclear family has diminished over the past fifteen years nor, indeed, that it is 
confined to politicians of the right. Rather it seems that family policy in the UK has 
been remarkably consistent across governments83 and that the new Labour 
Government is keen to establish itself as the party of the (nuclear) family. For 
example Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has argued that:  
 
'[i]t is a matter of good common sense that it is best for children, if you can achieve 
it, that they end up in a stable family environment with their parents ... [it is] 
inadvisable for women to have children with no intention of entering into a stable 
relationship with the father.'84  
 
Underlying the above discussion and central to my argument has been an 
assertion of the need to challenge precisely the common sense wisdom of these 
kinds of ideas; to recognise that the attribution of legal responsibilities on the basis 
of the biological fact of genetic parenthood is a social choice85 and, notably, one 
which we have made neither for women nor for men in all circumstances.86 
Pointing out that this is a choice, of course, provides no guidance regarding what 
other choices we might make or how we should make them. However, it can 
prompt us to state more explicitly and to interrogate our reasons for deciding in a 
particular way. Attribution of parental status, rights and obligations on the basis of 
genetics alone is out of step with the plurality of ways in which people choose to 
structure their living arrangements and parental choices in contemporary western 
society. I have also argued that it will lead to significant unfairness in a variety of 
cases. I would tentatively suggest that such unfairness will be more marked the 
further that the circumstances of conception depart from the law's implicit standard: 
the heterosexual, monogamous norm of the nuclear family.87  
In a careful and reasoned assessment of whether parents are morally obliged to 
care for their children, John Eekelaar has argued that such parental duties as exist 
are derived from a general social duty to promote human flourishing. It is social 
practices which place particular responsibility on some individuals.88 He notes: 
'Appreciation that social rules, not moral principles, attach duties to parenthood 
has important implications .... Such rules must be rational, in conformity with other 
principles of equity, and never overshadow the duties everyone owes to the 
child'.89 
 
Here, I have sought to demonstrate that the attribution of duties of child support 
liability to men who are victims of birth control fraud is part of a larger system of 
imposing the model of the nuclear family which benefits neither men nor women as 
a group in any unproblematic way, but which does serve precisely to overshadow 
the general duties which society as a whole owes to the child. The geneticisation of 
liability not only perpetuates women's dependency on men but also obscures the 
need for a proper debate about social responsibility for child care provision and 
funding. The birth control fraud cases are significant in prompting us to re-examine 
the genetic basis for the attribution of financial liability for children and in providing 
a particularly compelling example of where a genetic basis on its own is 
inadequate. If the versions of events presented by Wallis and SF are to be 
believed, then their stories pose a particular ethical problem for us. If we cannot 
provide a convincing answer to the question of why these men, rather than society 
as a whole, should be financially liable for these particular children, then we need 
to rethink what ethical principle it is which underlies the idea that individual parents 
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are financially responsible for their genetic offspring. To put it another way: 
whatever position one takes on the issue of whether children should be primarily a 
social or an individual responsibility, it is impossible to fix responsibility on 
particular individuals without some convincing reason as to why they should be 
liable rather than others. To state the existence of a genetic link is to make an 
empirical rather than a normative claim: it does not in itself provide any moral 
argument. To provide an answer to such complex ethical questions is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, what should be clear is that the moralistic and 
punitive normative underpinnings of the Child Support Act 1991 are signally 
incapable of contributing towards a convincing response. A more useful first step 
might be provided by the research of Gillian Douglas. Commenting on the decision 
of the Californian Supreme Court in a surrogacy dispute,90 Douglas raises the 
issue of whether intention should play a greater role in the attribution of parental 
status and rights. In conclusion, she notes that: 'We still require, or at least prefer, 
some sort of biological link to a child, be it genetic or gestational, because we view 
children as in some way the physical recreations of their parents. We still refuse to 
face up to the reality of our acceptance of the importance of social parenthood - to 
an idea of parenthood as departing from the traditional, pseudobiological model of 
two people of the opposite sex creating and rearing their offspring'.91 
Thinking about the birth control fraud cases discussed above lends some support 
to Douglas. 
The cases provide a particularly clear example of the potential unfairness of 
imposing parental obligations where intention to parent is clearly lacking. Yet at a 
time when the Government is both proposing the automatic extension of parental 
responsibility to greater numbers of unmarried fathers92 and is reported to be 
considering granting children born of gamete donation the right to trace their 
genetic parents, the genetic view of parenthood seems to be on the ascendancy.93 
Along with the well documented confusions caused by surrogacy and the new 
reproductive technologies, the cases discussed in this article provide a prompt for 
some further scrutiny of the fundamental principles at stake. The challenge which 
remains is how to rethink parental obligations and social responsibility for children 
in a way which is fairer, whilst recognising the need not to exacerbate the already 
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86 Under the terms of ss 27 and 28, Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, where gametes 
are obtained through a licensed clinic, sperm and egg donors are not deemed to be legal parents. 
When the woman receiving treatment services is married, her husband will be the legal father 
unless he objects. Where she receives these services in conjunction with a male partner, he will be 
deemed to be the legal father.  
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recent writing of David Morgan who has suggested that we would be better advised to think in 
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emphasis in original.  
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